Et l'activité mentale, Filosofia, Kant (Emmanuel). Etudes. emmanuelle_kant. Архив. Фотографии. Blog grant promo. Recommend this entry Has been recommended Send news. [–] Emmanuel__Kant 2 points3 points4 points 1 year ago (0 children). I have allways the high cost champion. Though Kant is as undeniably German as the Nord Stream pipeline, Putin (and anyone else anywhere) has a right to quote him morning, noon and. 3 monthly listeners.
Emmanuel Kant, no place to chance!
He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies. Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr.
И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками? Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М.
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And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori.
The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties.
We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects.
If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone.
For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure. First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause.
From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located.
We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being.
We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition.
Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers.
Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind.
Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class.
But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility.
If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998.
This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general.
So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience.
To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one.
Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience.
Книга вышла тиражом в пять тысяч экземпляров и доступна в магазине Кафедрального собора. Получить издание с автографом смогли все, кто пришел на встречу с автором 21 и 23 апреля. Но эта лекция - также доказательство безбрежности мира Канта. Кант - такая величина, что рядом с ним можно поставить любое другое слово, любую тему и написать на эту тему трактат. Кант отражается в каждой капле мироздания, и, надеюсь, к концу разговора будет ясно, что музыка - не крошечная часть его вселенной. Онлайн-трансляцию лекции можно посмотреть здесь. Кафедральный собор принимал Международный Кантовский конгресс, в котором в этом году участвовали 500 ученых из 23 стран. В 15 часов сотую, юбилейную, лекцию прочел профессор БФУ Леонард Александрович Калинников, посвятивший Канту более 180 статей и 8 монографий.
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. Emmanuel Kant is Lupa's first experience with Polski Theatre in Wroclaw, though the leading part is played by the protagonist of his first productions in Jelenia Gora, Wojciech Ziemianski. [–] Emmanuel__Kant 2 points3 points4 points 1 year ago (0 children). I have allways the high cost champion. Kant observed that men formed states to constrain their passions, but that each state sought to preserve its absolute freedom, even at the cost of “a lawless state of savagery.”. Emmanuel Kant слушать лучшее онлайн бесплатно в хорошем качестве на Яндекс Музыке. Биография немецкого философа Иммануила Канта: личная жизнь, присяга Российской империи, университет его имени, могила в Калининграде.
Immanuel Kant and Nazism
| Scholz “forbade” Putin from quoting Immanuel Kant | An unrelated news platform with which you have had no contact builds a profile based on that viewing behaviour, marking space exploration as a topic of possible interest for other videos. |
| Канте купил клуб в Бельгии после подписания контракта «Аль-Иттихадом» | Кант Иммануил (Immanuel Kant) (22.4.1724, Кёнигсберг, ныне Калининград – 12.2.1804, там же), немецкий философ, создатель «трансцендентального идеализма». |
| Emmanuel Kant Duarte | В бюллетенях голосования "Великие имена России", раздаваемых в самолётах, немецкого философа Иммануила Канта называют "Эммануилом". |
| Кант, Иммануил — Википедия | We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. |
Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе
In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge. On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object. Kant also spoke of the thing in itself or transcendent object as a product of the human understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view. Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding "Transcendental Analytic" and, second, with the faculty of reason as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles "Transcendental Dialectic". The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections. The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of the understanding i.
The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in empirical judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a thing in general—that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience. These, in conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic a priori cognition. The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment. As Kant was aware, this assumes precisely what the skeptic rejects, namely, the existence of synthetic a priori cognition. For this reason, Kant also supplies a synthetic argument that does not depend upon the assumption in dispute. Kant himself said that it is the one that cost him the most labor.
The task of the "Analytic of Principles" is to show both that they must universally apply to objects given in actual experience i. The second book continues this line of argument in four chapters, each associated with one of the category groupings. In some cases, it adds a connection to the spatial dimension of intuition to the categories it analyzes. Some commentators consider this the most significant section of the Critique. He argues that the unity of time implies that "all change must consist in the alteration of states in an underlying substance, whose existence and quantity must be unchangeable or conserved. That was the end of the chapter in the A edition of the Critique. The B edition includes one more short section, "The Refutation of Idealism". In this section, by analysis of the concept of self-consciousness, Kant argues that his transcendental idealism is a "critical" or "formal" idealism that does not deny the existence of reality apart from our subjective representations.
Against this, Kant reasserts his own insistence upon the necessity of a sensible component in all genuine knowledge. In particular, it is concerned to demonstrate as spurious the efforts of reason to arrive at knowledge independent of sensibility. This endeavor, Kant argues, is doomed to failure, which he claims to demonstrate by showing that reason, unbounded by sense, is always capable of generating opposing or otherwise incompatible conclusions. Like "the light dove, in free flight cutting through the air, the resistance of which it feels", reason "could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space". He presents the speculative excesses of traditional metaphysics as inherent in our very capacity of reason. Moreover, he argues that its products are not without some carefully qualified regulative value. They are different from the concepts of understanding in that they are not limited by the critical stricture limiting knowledge to the conditions of possible experience and its objects.
Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. В 2008 году режиссёр получил "Золотую пальмовую ветвь" за картину "Класс", снятую по роману Франсуа Бегодо "Между стен" о жизни учителя одной из школ Парижа.
Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Лаб: все выпуски.
Онлайн-трансляцию лекции можно посмотреть здесь. Кафедральный собор принимал Международный Кантовский конгресс, в котором в этом году участвовали 500 ученых из 23 стран. В 15 часов сотую, юбилейную, лекцию прочел профессор БФУ Леонард Александрович Калинников, посвятивший Канту более 180 статей и 8 монографий. Традиционно украсили могилу мыслителя цветами в 17. Несколько лет назад она была написана специально для этого места и с тех пор больше нигде не исполнялась. Главным компонентом спектакля о Канте, где Дмитрий Минченок проживает жизнь человека, которого все признают великим, остается импровизация. Гений в науке - в жизни один из нас. Он страдал, как мы, любил, как мы, и я ищу эти точки соприкосновения, где он является обычным человеком с необычными слабостями.
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
Emmanuel Kant, Gravure sur bois, publiée en 1881. Иммануи́л Кант — немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения. Всесторонние и систематические работы Канта в области эпистемологии, метафизики. О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам.
«Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen. Breaking Irish and International News. В бюллетенях голосования "Великие имена России", раздаваемых в самолётах, немецкого философа Иммануила Канта называют "Эммануилом". Kant observed that men formed states to constrain their passions, but that each state sought to preserve its absolute freedom, even at the cost of “a lawless state of savagery.”. Кант Иммануил (Immanuel Kant) (22.4.1724, Кёнигсберг, ныне Калининград – 12.2.1804, там же), немецкий философ, создатель «трансцендентального идеализма».
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
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Женщин же он считал существами, не способными логически мыслить. Рецепт один — отойти в сторону, чтобы не заразиться.
Был момент, когда Кант в Кенигсберге оказался практически рок-звездой. Его работы мало кто мог прочесть и осмыслить, но это добавляло загадочности персонажу. В городе его знали все, и все делали вид, что понимают хоть что-нибудь. С другой стороны, если уж Генрих Гейне, которому было семь лет, когда Кант умер, так сильно спустя годы реагировал на упоминание философских трудов чудака из Кенигсберга не любил Гейне «Критику чистого разума», что тут поделаешь?
График не на фиг Он был узнаваем. Человек, ненавидевший дневник в гимназии и самокопание, придумал для себя график. График, практически исключавший вмешательства извне. Как ни странно, этот график как раз извне был особенно интересен: выход из дома в определенный час на прогулку по определенному маршруту.
Те, кто в дом были вхожи, знали и другие правила. В пять утра встать после семичасового сна, надеть колпак, а сверху — маленькую треугольную шляпу. Работать до семи в кабинете. Прочитать лекцию.
Без пятнадцати час начать одеваться к обеду, пообедать и пойти на прогулку. Его прогулки стали настолько известными, что на пути Канта стали караулить местные попрошайки. На прогулках он дышал носом. Считал, что это правило гигиены.
Что же касается обеда, то это был единственный прием пищи, с тремя блюдами. В остальное время был слабый чай, а за обедом — полбутылки французского вина философ предпочитал медок. Пива не любил. Часто приглашал друзей, но при условии, что за едой никто не будет говорить о философии.
Сам страдал, когда видел, что кому-то может быть нанесен вред. Одна история: слуга разбил бокал во время обеда. Осколки стали настоящей проблемой: Кант боялся за гостей, за слугу, и начал сам собирать осколки.
Instead, I wish to conclude by calling attention to the disdain that some fascist philosophers displayed toward Kant. But here we need to consider the crucial question: To what extent should a philosopher be held responsible for how later thinkers used his ideas, especially when those later interpretations differ radically from how the original philosopher understood his own system? In truth, the philosophy of fascism and National Socialism was a patchwork, a stitching together of disparate ideas taken, frequently out of context, from whatever sources would lend credibility to their quest to justify a totalitarian state. With the possible exception of Martin Heidegger, who joined the Nazi Party in 1933, no philosophy written by a fascist was worth the paper it was written on.
We should therefore exercise extreme caution before condemning Kant or any other philosopher as a forerunner of fascism and Nazism. Related Articles.
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Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
Это стремление — источник всех метафизических систем, их претензий на сверхопытное знание. Несостоятельность этих стремлений, однако, не означает, что основные идеи метафизики мир как целое; свобода, предшествующая необходимости; субстанциальность души; Бог должны быть отброшены. Эти идеи имманентны разуму, они являются регулятивными принципами познания, осуществляют высший синтез знаний, приобретаемых рассудком. Метафизика — высшая культура разума, без которой немыслимо его существование. Необходимо, однако, создание метафизики как науки, как системы априорных синтетических суждений, которые не претендуют на познание трансцендентного. Это значит, что идеи метафизики никоим образом не указывают на существование того, что в них мыслится, т. Отсюда его убеждение: «Мне пришлось ограничить [aufheben] знание, чтобы освободить место вере... Речь идёт не об ограничении познания природы или общества, а об ограничении претензий разума на познание метафизической реальности, которая принципиально недоступна познанию. Одним из важнейших разделов трансцендентальной диалектики является учение об антиномиях , т. Каждая антиномия состоит из тезиса и антитезиса, причём оба эти положения в равной мере доказуемы.
Так, тезис одной из антиномий утверждает, что существует «свободная причинность», т. Антитезис, напротив, утверждает, что нет никакой свободы, и всё совершается по законам природы. Антиномии кажутся неразрешимыми противоречиями, однако Кант полагает, что они вполне разрешимы, если учесть, что, кроме чувственно воспринимаемой реальности, существует трансцендентный мир «вещей в себе» и человек представляет собой не только явление природы, но и «вещь в себе». В таком случае антиномия свободы и необходимости вполне разрешима: человек как «вещь в себе» свободен, но он же подчинён необходимости как явление, природное существо. Все главные проблемы критической философии Канта сводятся к вопросу: «Что такое человек? В центре «Критики практического разума» — понятие чистого нравственного сознания, не признающего никаких иных побудительных мотивов поступков человека, кроме свободного от всяких предпочтений сознания долга. Это означает, что нравственное сознание, в силу своей автономии, свободы, независимо также от религии. Такое воздаяние, как правило, неосуществимо в земной человеческой жизни. Но поскольку справедливость не знает границ во времени и пространстве, необходимо верить в загробную жизнь людей.
Это доказательство, обосновывая разумность и необходимость религиозной веры, не утверждает, однако, что Бог и бессмертие души действительно существуют, ибо трансцендентное абсолютно непознаваемо. Всеобъемлющим нравственным законом является, по Канту, категорический императив безусловное повеление , который гласит: поступай так, чтобы максима т. Теория практического разума включает в себя и учение о праве, правовом государстве. Право является реализацией свободы члена общества, ограниченной лишь свободой других его членов. Республика, принцип которой составляет разделение властей, — постулат чистого практического разума. Поэтому человек лишь постольку морален, поскольку он признаёт равенство всех других индивидов перед законом, отрицая тем самым любые сословные привилегии. Философско-исторические воззрения Канта непосредственно связаны с его философией права , т.
Сперва расскажу старый анекдот: Урок труда у девочек, тема - шитье. Учительница говорит: — Девочки, мы сегодня изучаем выворачивание канта наизнанку. Леночка поднимает руку, встаёт и спрашивает: — Марь Иванна, это как? Звёздное небо внутри нас и нравственный закон над головой? Это очень популярная шутка. Бородатая шутка. Еще одна бородатая шутка: «Вчера стирала пододеяльник в машине и поняла, что такое вещь в себе». Большого количества анекдотов не возникло, полагаю, потому, что редкие смеющиеся вряд ли могли сразу обсуждать эмпиризм, имманентность и кант его знает, что еще. Императив, например. Генрих Гейне про Канта писал, что невозможно ничего написать про жизнь Канта, поскольку и не было у него жизни. Не было, неужели? Так что знаем мы? Кроме того, что в городе Калининграде бывшем Кенинсберге какой-то отморозок на стене написал корявыми буквами: «Кант — лох». Мои мысли — мои скакуны 18 век, 1724 год, прусский город Кенигсберг. Шорник — это мастер такой, который изготавливает упряжь для лошадей. Уздечки, седла, шоры те же самые… Шорник был довольно успешен, женат на дочери другого шорника, которая родила ему множество детей, быстро и болезненно покинувших этот мир. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Людей, которые готовят все, что обуздывает лошадей. Так что мысли-скакуны у Канта были очень упорядочены в дальнейшем. Следи за собой, будь осторожен Семья беднела медленно, но верно. В какой-то момент дом Канта официально был признан бедным отец старел, мать умерла, еще пожар был, был и новый дом. Зачислили в реестр бедных ремесленников, помогали дровами, снизили налоговую ставку. Потом мальчик получил шанс поступить в престижную гимназию. Он ненавидел ее, но изучил латынь, немного французского, основы английского языка. Одна из причин ненависти была такая: ученики этой гимназии должны были ежедневно вести дневник.
Изменилось не только содержание, но и оформление - в залах установили новый профессиональный свет, заменили травмоопасные лестницы и сделали косметический ремонт. Сегодня экспозиция насчитывает более 2000 предметов и решена с использованием современных технологий - появились монофоны, игры, мультимедийные инсталляции. Есть несколько залов, где мы интерактивные приемы используем. В зале "Кенигсбергское время", например, можно услышать цитаты известных людей определенной эпохи - мы о пяти веках Кенигсберга говорим. Надели мононаушник — слышим Иммануила Канта, который рассуждает о городе. Надели другой - мы уже в двадцатом столетии, слышим Маяковского, который прилетал в Кенигсберг и из Девау ехал на машине в Берлин. Мне кажется, это очень интересно.
Почему история философии делится на «до» и «после» Канта? И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками? Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М.
Лауреат Каннского кинофестиваля, французский режиссёр Лоран Канте умер в 63 года
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