Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте дал предварительное согласие на переход в «Арсенал» по окончании сезона, сообщает Fichajes. Новости компаний. Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog! Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen.
Emmanuel Kant
Подробная информация о фильме Последние дни Иммануила Канта на сайте Кинопоиск. О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам. Иммануи́л Кант — немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения. Всесторонние и систематические работы Канта в области эпистемологии, метафизики. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. Новости компаний. Иммануил Кант – немецкий философ, основал немецкую классическую философию, жил в эпоху Просвещения и романтизма.
Канте может перейти в «Арсенал» летом
Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение. Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.
Способен ли он надеяться? В третьем ответе кантовского чат-бота надежду чат-бот высказал относительно того, что будет развиваться, но уровня человеческого мышления не достигнет, но, на мой взгляд, это сомнительно.
Мне кажется, что это вполне реально, и я, с одной стороны, боюсь, с другой — надеюсь застать это на своём веку. Ну и, конечно, последний вопрос: чем вообще является искусственный интеллект? Если по Канту, человек — это моральное существо, можем ли таким моральным существом считать искусственный интеллект?
Без них все превосходные природные задатки человечества остались бы навсегда неразвитыми. Главным направлением культурного прогресса является, по Канту, сближение народов, благодаря которому, вследствие действия того же «механизма природы», будет навсегда покончено с войнами и народы всей планеты объединятся в мирном союзе. Заключительной частью системы Канта является «Критика способности суждения». Кант различает два вида способности суждения: определяющую и рефлектирующую размышляющую. В первом случае речь идёт о том, чтобы подвести особенное под уже известное общее. Во втором случае особенное должно быть подведено под общее, которое не дано, а должно быть найдено. В данном труде он исследует эту вторую, рефлектирующую способность суждения. Её основными формами являются телеологические и эстетические суждения.
И те и другие выявляют целесообразность, присущую не только явлениям природы, например живым организмам, но и объектам суждений вкуса. В действительности, как считает Кант, целесообразность не присуща ни предметам природы, ни предметам суждений вкуса; она привносится в природу априорной рефлектирующей способностью суждения, которая не обогащает наших знаний о природе, но способствует их приведению в систему. Необходимость телеологических суждений обусловлена тем, что рассудок оказывается неспособным объяснить естественными причинами наблюдаемые факты целесообразности в природе. Эстетические суждения, в отличие от телеологических, связаны с удовольствием или неудовольствием, вызываемыми представлением о предметах. Эстетическое удовольствие Кант характеризует как незаинтересованное в том смысле, что оно обусловлено исключительно восприятием прекрасного , к которому не примешиваются как-либо не связанные с этим восприятием интересы. Незаинтересованность эстетического суждения придаёт ему объективную значимость, несмотря на его субъективное содержание. Эстетическое суждение не относится к познавательной деятельности и не зависит от нравственного сознания. Идеалом красоты, согласно Канту, может быть только человек.
Философия Канта оказала громадное воздействие на всё последующее развитие европейской мысли. Он явился родоначальником немецкой классической философии, представленной системами И. Фихте , Ф. Шеллинга , Г. Гегеля , влияние его испытали Ф. Шиллер , А. Шопенгауэр , представители йенского романтизма. Под знаком возвращения к методологии Канта в Германии и других европейских странах складываются во 2-й половине 19 в.
Проблематика идей Канта остаётся актуальной для большинства философских направлений 20 в. Опубликовано 1 июня 2022 г.
Кант находит работу домашнего учителя и на протяжении долгих десяти лет учит детишек из богатых семей. Все свободное время молодой человек посвящал написанию философских трудов, которые впоследствии стали основой его учения. В 1755-м философ возвращается в родной вуз. Его цель — защита диссертации «Об огне» и получение степени магистра.
Осенью того же года он представил свою новую работу «Новое освещение первых принципов метафизического познания» и стал доктором наук. Теперь он имеет право преподавать в университете и незамедлительно воспользовался этой возможностью. Он учил студентов логике и метафизике. Самой интересной работой первого периода философской деятельности Канта ученые назвали «Всеобщую естественную историю и теорию неба». В ней изложена история происхождения Вселенной, причем с точки зрения физики, а не теологии. В том же периоде Кант занялся изучением теории пространства с точки зрения физики.
Он верил в то, что Высший Разум существует, и именно он положил начало жизни на Земле. Иммануил говорил, что существование материи доказывает существование Бога. Он считал, что за материальными вещами обязательно стоит их Создатель. Именно эта мысль отражена в его труде под названием «Единственно возможное основание для доказательства бытия Бога». Начало критического периода философского творчества Канта пришлось на годы преподавания логики и метафизики в вузе. Гипотезы ученого менялись постепенно.
Вначале он пересмотрел свое отношение к пространству и времени. Этот период биографы Канта назвали критицизмом. В эти годы он пристально изучал этику, эстетику, гносеологию, написал самые выдающиеся свои работы, которые легли в основу мирового учения. В 1781-м научная биография философа расширилась самой фундаментальной работой под названием «Критика чистого разума», где он разъясняет, что такое категорический императив. Личная жизнь Кант был далеко не красавцем, невысокий, с впалой грудью и узкими плечами. Несмотря на это, он всегда выглядел опрятным и ухоженным, ежемесячно ходил к парикмахеру и портному.
Иммануил предпочитал затворничество, он так и не создал семью, потому что свято верил, что личная жизнь станет помехой занятиям наукой. Именно эта уверенность не дала ему повести под венец одну из красавиц, которые постоянно его окружали. Он любил красивых женщин и не переставал ими восхищаться. В преклонном возрасте он перестал видеть левым глазом, поэтому всегда усаживал одну из юных красавиц с правой стороны. Философ никому никогда не признавался в своих чувствах. Одна из женщин из его окружения — Луиза Ребекка Фриц, впоследствии вспоминала, что вызывала симпатию ученого.
По мнению Боровского Кант влюблялся два раза, и даже собирался жениться на своих возлюбленных. Иммануил отличался редким педантизмом, он придерживался распорядка вплоть до минуты, ни разу в жизни не опоздал.
Immanuel Kant
Канта Валентин Балановский. Кое-что может найти и человек, который хорошо разбирается в предмете. Книга вышла тиражом в пять тысяч экземпляров и доступна в магазине Кафедрального собора. Получить издание с автографом смогли все, кто пришел на встречу с автором 21 и 23 апреля. Но эта лекция - также доказательство безбрежности мира Канта. Кант - такая величина, что рядом с ним можно поставить любое другое слово, любую тему и написать на эту тему трактат. Кант отражается в каждой капле мироздания, и, надеюсь, к концу разговора будет ясно, что музыка - не крошечная часть его вселенной.
В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития. В специальной сессии приняли участие ведущие специалисты в области международной политики из России, Финляндии, Германии, Индии и Республики Беларусь. Идея учреждения данной площадки была впервые высказана академиком А. Дынкиным в ходе проведения российско-белорусского форума «Рубежи Союзного государства» , организованного в октябре 2022 г.
The little people! This is called exploitation, and using unconsenting human beings as a means to an end. Jimmy thinks its funny. Of course, any drama that Gibson directs pales in comparison to his own behind-the-scenes odyssey: the story of an odious individual who, after years on the outskirts of Hollywood, has somehow managed to fight his way back into the mainstream.
Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom. Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations. And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another. But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire. In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way. So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be. Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing. Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way. Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control. To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us. But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity. Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims. Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally. Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61. This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it. This is, naturally, a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know whether that maxim could also hold as a universal practical law. I therefore apply the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could through my maxim at the same time give such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove has been made. I at once become aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that there would be no deposits at all. The issue is not whether it would be good if everyone acted on my maxim, or whether I would like it, but only whether it would be possible for my maxim to be willed as a universal law. This gets at the form, not the matter or content, of the maxim. A maxim has morally permissible form, for Kant, only if it could be willed as a universal law. If my maxim fails this test, as this one does, then it is morally impermissible for me to act on it. If my maxim passes the universal law test, then it is morally permissible for me to act on it, but I fully exercise my autonomy only if my fundamental reason for acting on this maxim is that it is morally permissible or required that I do so. Imagine that I am moved by a feeling of sympathy to formulate the maxim to help someone in need. In this case, my original reason for formulating this maxim is that a certain feeling moved me. Such feelings are not entirely within my control and may not be present when someone actually needs my help. So it would not be wrong to act on this maxim when the feeling of sympathy so moves me. But helping others in need would not fully exercise my autonomy unless my fundamental reason for doing so is not that I have some feeling or desire, but rather that it would be right or at least permissible to do so. Only when such a purely formal principle supplies the fundamental motive for my action do I act autonomously. Even when my maxims are originally suggested by my feelings and desires, if I act only on morally permissible or required maxims because they are morally permissible or required , then my actions will be autonomous. And the reverse is true as well: for Kant this is the only way to act autonomously. The highest good and practical postulates Kant holds that reason unavoidably produces not only consciousness of the moral law but also the idea of a world in which there is both complete virtue and complete happiness, which he calls the highest good. Furthermore, we can believe that the highest good is possible only if we also believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, according to Kant. On this basis, he claims that it is morally necessary to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, which he calls postulates of pure practical reason. Moreover, our fundamental reason for choosing to act on such maxims should be that they have this lawgiving form, rather than that acting on them would achieve some end or goal that would satisfy a desire 5:27. For example, I should help others in need not, at bottom, because doing so would make me feel good, even if it would, but rather because it is right; and it is right or permissible to help others in need because this maxim can be willed as a universal law. Although Kant holds that the morality of an action depends on the form of its maxim rather than its end or goal, he nevertheless claims both that every human action has an end and that we are unavoidably concerned with the consequences of our actions 4:437; 5:34; 6:5—7, 385. This is not a moral requirement but simply part of what it means to be a rational being. Moreover, Kant also holds the stronger view that it is an unavoidable feature of human reason that we form ideas not only about the immediate and near-term consequences of our actions, but also about ultimate consequences. But neither of these ideas by itself expresses our unconditionally complete end, as human reason demands in its practical use. And happiness by itself would not be unconditionally good, because moral virtue is a condition of worthiness to be happy 5:111. So our unconditionally complete end must combine both virtue and happiness. It is this ideal world combining complete virtue with complete happiness that Kant normally has in mind when he discusses the highest good. Kant says that we have a duty to promote the highest good, taken in this sense 5:125. He does not mean, however, to be identifying some new duty that is not derived from the moral law, in addition to all the particular duties we have that are derived from the moral law. Rather, as we have seen, Kant holds that it is an unavoidable feature of human reasoning, instead of a moral requirement, that we represent all particular duties as leading toward the promotion of the highest good. Nor does Kant mean that anyone has a duty to realize or actually bring about the highest good through their own power, although his language sometimes suggests this 5:113, 122. Here Kant does not mean that we unavoidably represent the highest good as possible, since his view is that we must represent it as possible only if we are to fulfill our duty of promoting it, and yet we may fail at doing our duty. Rather, we have a choice about whether to conceive of the highest good as possible, to regard it as impossible, or to remain noncommittal 5:144—145. But we can fulfill our duty of promoting the highest good only by choosing to conceive of the highest good as possible, because we cannot promote any end without believing that it is possible to achieve that end 5:122. This is because to comply with that duty we must believe that the highest good is possible, and yet to believe that the highest good is possible we must believe that the soul is immortal and that God exists, according to Kant. The highest good, as we have seen, would be a world of complete morality and happiness. This does not mean that we can substitute endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law for holiness in the concept of the highest good, but rather that we must represent that complete conformity as an infinite progress toward the limit of holiness. Rather, his view is that we must represent holiness as continual progress toward complete conformity of our dispositions with the moral law that begins in this life and extends into infinity.
Scholz “forbade” Putin from quoting Immanuel Kant
Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. Posts about Emmanuel Kant written by Jack Marshall. Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет.
Кант Иммануил
Есть несколько залов, где мы интерактивные приемы используем. В зале "Кенигсбергское время", например, можно услышать цитаты известных людей определенной эпохи - мы о пяти веках Кенигсберга говорим. Надели мононаушник — слышим Иммануила Канта, который рассуждает о городе. Надели другой - мы уже в двадцатом столетии, слышим Маяковского, который прилетал в Кенигсберг и из Девау ехал на машине в Берлин. Мне кажется, это очень интересно. Канта Валентин Балановский. Кое-что может найти и человек, который хорошо разбирается в предмете.
The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition.
If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5.
The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life. Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based. Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws.
Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes.
The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God. In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong.
Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me. If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not?
The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time.
But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now.
For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact?
How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom.
Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations. And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable.
But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim.
A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another. But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles.
To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire.
In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way. So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be.
The 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment the third Critique applied the Kantian system to aesthetics and teleology. There were several journals devoted solely to defending and criticizing Kantian philosophy. Despite his success, philosophical trends were moving in another direction. In what was one of his final acts expounding a stance on philosophical questions, Kant opposed these developments and publicly denounced Fichte in an open letter in 1799. Kant always cut a curious figure in his lifetime for his modest, rigorously scheduled habits, which have been referred to as clocklike. Heinrich Heine observed the magnitude of "his destructive, world-crushing thoughts" and considered him a sort of philosophical "executioner", comparing him to Robespierre with the observation that both men "represented in the highest the type of provincial bourgeois. Nature had destined them to weigh coffee and sugar, but Fate determined that they should weigh other things and placed on the scales of the one a king, on the scales of the other a god. Originally, Kant was buried inside the cathedral, but in 1880 his remains were moved to a neo-Gothic chapel adjoining the northeast corner of the cathedral. Over the years, the chapel became dilapidated and was demolished to make way for the mausoleum, which was built on the same location. The tomb and its mausoleum are among the few artifacts of German times preserved by the Soviets after they captured the city. This new evidence of the power of human reason, called into question for many the traditional authority of politics and religion. In particular, the modern mechanistic view of the world called into question the very possibility of morality; for, if there is no agency, there cannot be any responsibility. What should I do? What may I hope? It argues that even though we cannot, strictly know that we are free, we can—and for practical purposes, must—think of ourselves as free. In brief, Kant argues that the mind itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to knowledge , that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles. First, Kant makes a distinction in terms of the source of the content of knowledge: Cognitions a priori: "cognition independent of all experience and even of all the impressions of the senses". Cognitions a posteriori: cognitions that have their sources in experience—that is, which are empirical. These can also be called "judgments of clarification". Synthetic proposition: a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; e. These can also be called "judgments of amplification". All analytic propositions are a priori it is analytically true that no analytic proposition could be a posteriori. By contrast, a synthetic proposition is one the content of which includes something new. The truth or falsehood of a synthetic statement depends upon something more than what is contained in its concepts. The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation. This is because, unlike a posteriori cognition, a priori cognition has "true or strict... It is the twofold aim of the Critique both to prove and to explain the possibility of this knowledge. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a particular object, and the latter is a discursive or mediate representation of a general type of object. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic a priori. In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge.
Kant for us is a Russian trophy. Like everything you see in the Kaliningrad region - said Alikhanov. He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies.
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Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic) sur TikTok |66.4K j'aime.23.8K e la dernière vidéo de Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic). Источник: РИА "Новости". 3 monthly listeners. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen.
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Settings and more. Buffering. Emmanuelle Kant (Original Mix) (our 2nd recordeal!) BESTINSPACE ™. Immanuel Kant Idealism. The inscrutable wisdom [of God] through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in respect to what it has granted. Ректор БФУ им. Иммануила Канта Александр Федоров отметил: философия не эксклюзивное занятие, ею, осмысляя действительность и место в ней, занимается каждый. Адмиралы Балтийского флота уверены, что Канта звали Эммануэль. Эммануэль Кант.#кант #балтфлот Иммануил Кант родился в Кенигсберге в 1724 году, прожил в городе всю жизнь, не покидая его пределов, и был похоронен у северной стены Собора в профессорском склепе.
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Просмотрите свежий пост @fakepontchartrain в Tumblr на тему "emmanuel kant". Адмиралы Балтийского флота уверены, что Канта звали Эммануэль. Эммануэль Кант.#кант #балтфлот The Life, Work and Legacy of Carl Jung. Category: Emmanuel Kant. emmanuelle_kant. Архив. Фотографии. Blog grant promo. Recommend this entry Has been recommended Send news.
Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024
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German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced this at a ceremony dedicated to the 300th anniversary of the German philosopher. According to him, the Russian authorities are seeking to appropriate Kant and his works. Putin has not the slightest reason to refer to Kant. Let us note that earlier the governor of the Kaliningrad region, Anton Alikhanov, called the philosopher Immanuel Kant a Russian trophy.
С другой стороны, попытаться связать и по-хорошему использовать учение Канта для решения заново или впервые возникающих проблем - это задача каждого нового поколения. Тема исследования Канта не будет исчерпана еще следующие лет триста, - отметила научный директор Академии Кантианы БФУ им. Канта" Актуальность работ Канта можно было проследить и по многочисленным вопросам, которые докладчикам на сессиях задавали прямо из зала. Так, например, врио директора Института философии РАН Абдусаламу Гусейнову пришлось объяснять, чем практическая философия по Канту отличается от моральной. Однако, насколько мне известно, философ никогда их сильно не разграничивал. А вот понимание права - уже совсем другой вопрос. Для Иммануила Канта право являлось, по сути, категорическим императивом. В то же время существует метафизика нравственности, в рамках которой Кант предлагал воспринимать этику как некую науку, отличную от философии, - заключил ученый.
Отца будущего светила философии звали Иоганн Георг Кант, он был ремесленником-седельщиком. Мама — Анна Регина, занималась домом и растила двенадцать детей. Иммануил стал четвертым ребенком, многие из его братьев и сестер умерли в младенческом возрасте. Выжить удалось трем сестрам и двум братьям. Детство Иммануила прошло в небольшом доме, который полностью сгорел во время пожара в 18-м веке. Юношеские годы Кант провел среди обычных ремесленников и рабочих, живших на окраине Кёнигсберга. Историкам так и не удалось точно выяснить, кем же был по национальности великий философ. Одни утверждали, что предки по отцовской линии жили в Шотландии, однако эта информация так и осталась неподтвержденной. Родня по линии матери проживала в немецком городе Нюрнберге. Родители мальчика заложили основы духовного воспитания сына, они сами были глубоко верующими людьми и принадлежали к лютеранской церкви, а если точнее, то к ее особому течению — пиетизму. Учение заключалось в том, что человек находится непрестанно на глазах у Господа, поэтому должен соблюдать личное благочестие. Именно мама прививала детям основы вероисповедания, знакомила их с красотой окружающего мира. Проповеди в церкви и занятия, на которых изучали Библию, Анна Регина посещала вместе с детьми. Достаточно часто в доме Кантов можно было встретить доктора теологии Франца Шульца, который и заметил незаурядные способности Иммануила в изучении Библии, а еще умение выражать и отстаивать собственные суждения. Мальчику исполнилось 8, когда мама привела его в самую лучшую школу Кенигсберга. Это была гимназия им. Фридриха, и ее рекомендовал в качестве учебного заведения именно Шульц. Он сел за школьную парту в 1732 году и провел там восемь лет. Уроки начинались в семь часов и продолжались до девяти. Главными предметами были Ветхий и Новый заветы, теология, география, латынь, греческий и немецкий языки. Изучение философии начиналось в старшей школе, и Иммануил всегда говорил, что этот предмет изучали неправильно. Заниматься математикой можно было только за деньги, к тому же, если у ученика имелось желание. Родители уже видели сына в сане священника, но мальчик с большим интересом изучал латынь и мечтал в будущем стать преподавателем словесности. К тому же, ученикам религиозной школы приходилось подчиняться строгим правилам и нравам этого заведения, а Канту это очень не нравилось. Иммануил никогда не отличался крепким здоровьем, однако показывал отличные успехи в учебе, все благодаря природной сообразительности и недюжинным умственным способностям. В возрасте тринадцати лет мальчик потерял маму. Она долго болела и так и не смогла оправиться. Семья влачила жалкое существование, Кант зачастую нуждался в самом элементарном. Он практически голодал, и не отказывался от помощи более богатых однокурсников. Случалось так, что ему нечего было обуть, тогда он одалживал ботинки у друзей, и шел на лекции.
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Immanuel Kant
Идея учреждения данной площадки была впервые высказана академиком А. Дынкиным в ходе проведения российско-белорусского форума «Рубежи Союзного государства» , организованного в октябре 2022 г. В 2022-2023 г. Проект направлен на развитие научно-экспертного и общественного диалога между странами большого Балтийско-Скандинавского региона: странами ЕС — с одной стороны и Россией и Белоруссией — с другой, с привлечением экспертов из других стран и регионов мира.
Об этом 21 ноября 2018 года сообщила в Facebook пассажир одного из самолётов. Выходит, организаторы присвоения имени аэропорту Храброво столкнулись с трудностями написания имени немецкого философа. Несмотря на трудности в орфографии в самолётах, Кант по-прежнему лидирует, опережая даже самого резвого ближайшего конкурента - императрицу Елизавету Петровну. По состоянию на 21.
For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine.
On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature.
Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life. Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based.
Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws. Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God.
In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me.
If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not? The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past.
So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now.
For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism.
But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom. Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations.
And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally.
First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another. But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff.
Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20.
Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение. Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.